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 Abstract  
Background 
Patient safety is concerned with preventable harm in healthcare, a subject that 
became a focus for study in the UK in the late 1990s. How to improve patient 
safety, presented both a practical and a research challenge in the early 2000s, 
leading to the eleven publications presented in this thesis. 
Research question  
The overarching research question was: What are the key organisational and 
systems factors that impact on patient safety, and how can these best be 
researched?  
Methods 
Research was conducted in over 40 acute care organisations in the UK and 
Europe between 2006 and 2013. The approaches included surveys, interviews, 
documentary analysis and non-participant observation. Two studies were 
longitudinal. 
Results 
The findings reveal the nature and extent of poor systems reliability and its 
effect on patient safety; the factors underpinning cases of patient harm; the 
cultural issues impacting on safety and quality; and the importance of a 
common language for quality and safety across an organisation.  
Across the publications, nine key organisational and systems factors emerged 
as important for patient safety improvement. These include leadership stability; 
data infrastructure; measurement capability; standardisation of clinical systems; 
and creating an open and fair collective culture where poor safety is challenged.  
Conclusions and contribution to knowledge 
The research presented in the publications has provided a more complete 
understanding of the organisation and systems factors underpinning safer 
healthcare.  
Lessons are drawn to inform methods for future research, including: how to 
define success in patient safety improvement studies; how to take into account 
  
external influences during longitudinal studies; and how to confirm meaning in 
multi-language research. Finally, recommendations for future research include 
assessing the support required to maintain a patient safety focus during periods 
of major change or austerity; the skills needed by healthcare leaders; and the 
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This thesis brings together eleven publications, including ten peer reviewed 
journal papers and one published research monograph. The publications are 
drawn from four research studies, each considering the organisational and 
systems factors impacting on patient safety. Considered as a whole, the 
research was conducted in over 40 hospital organisations, between 2006 and 
2013.  
The research studies are as follows:  
1. A longitudinal study of the ‘Safer Patients Initiative’ (SPI), a large scale 
intervention to improve patient safety in 24 UK NHS organisations (The 
Journey to Safety Study: papers 1, 2 and 3) (Burnett et al., 2010, Burnett 
et al., 2008, Benn et al., 2009) 
2. A study of the reliability of clinical systems in seven UK NHS 
organisations (the Warwick and Imperial Study to Enhance Reliability in 
Healthcare (WISER): papers 4, 5 and 6) (Burnett et al., 2011a, Burnett et 
al., 2012a, Burnett et al., 2011b)  
3. An analysis of the causes of wrong site and wrong procedure surgery in 
the NHS in England (paper 7) (Burnett et al., 2012b) 
4. An investigation into the factors impacting on quality and safety in ten 
hospitals in five European countries (the QUASER study: papers 8, 9, 
10 and 11) (Robert et al., 2011, Burnett et al., 2013, Burnett et al., 2016, 
Wiig et al., 2014) 
This section sets the context for these publications, beginning with an overview 
of patient safety, followed by the definition of the terms used and finally a 
discussion of related research leading to the rationale for the research 
presented in this thesis. 
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1.1. Overview of patient safety 
Patient safety is concerned with preventable harm in healthcare (World Health 
Organisation, 2015). Every surgical procedure carries with it the risk of 
complications and many prescribed drugs have the potential for unwanted and 
sometimes serious side effects. Some of these risks may be related to the 
patient’s disease process or condition and, as such, may not be preventable. 
What is and what is not considered preventable harm has changed over time 
and there are currently numerous definitions. For example, a recent systematic 
review (Nabhan et al., 2012) found 132 definitions, which largely could be 
placed in one of the following categories:  
1) Presence of an identifiable modifiable cause  
2) Reasonable adaptation to a process will prevent future recurrence  
3) Lack of adherence to guidelines implies preventability  
As medical knowledge has developed, so too has knowledge about what is a 
‘modifiable cause’ and now the term ‘patient safety’ encompasses harm from, 
for example missed doses of medication, to failure to adhere to national clinical 
guidelines (see 3 above).  
It has been known throughout history that doctors can harm their patients 
(Wootton, 2006, Sharpe and Faden, 1998). However, terms such as ‘patient 
harm’, ‘medical error’, ‘adverse events’ and ‘patient safety’ only became widely 
discussed in the medical literature from the 1980s1 (see table 1). The extent of 
patient harm did not became a focus for study until the 1990s, when it was 
found that, in US hospitals, 3.7%  of patients were being harmed by their 
healthcare and, in UK, the corresponding figure was 10%, with much of this 
harm being preventable (Brennan et al., 1991, Vincent et al., 2001). A timeline 
and more comprehensive overview of the history of medical harm, safety and 
risk management is provided in appendix 1. 
                                                          
1
 The term ‘patient safety’ only became a MESH term in PubMed in 2012 
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Number of articles referring to patient 
safety 
BMJ Lancet PubMed 
1800-1960 160 87 2 2057 
1961-1980 20 90 31 12401 
1981-1990 10 71 43 20123 
1991-2000 10 233 215 39106 
2001-2010 10 822 459 85186 
2011-2015 5 853 552 76264 
Note: Based on a search for (singular and plural)2 “patient safety”; “medical 
harm”; “medical error”; and “adverse events” in the title or abstract  
In the wider society, the UK government had been intervening to improve safety 
in other industries for over 160 years (for example, the 1833 Factories Act (UK 
National Archives, 2016)). Research to understand and improve safety had 
grown from this, particularly in industries where risks were high and safety was 
paramount, for example in mines and factories, and later in aviation and nuclear 
power. In the NHS, concern over the rising costs of claims for clinical 
negligence (see appendix 1) led the UK government, in the 1990s, to 
                                                          
2
 "medical harm" OR "patient harm" OR "medical error*" OR error* OR "adverse 
event*" OR “patient safety” 
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encourage the introduction of risk management into the NHS. During this time, 
public concern over the quality of care in the NHS continued to grow, following a 
number of high profile cases of poor care, for example the deaths of children 
from heart surgery in Bristol (Savage, 1998, Kennedy, 2001). This led to further 
government intervention with a White Paper in 1997 introducing:  
‘..a new system of clinical governance in NHS Trusts... to ensure that clinical 
standards are met, and that processes are in place to ensure continuous 
improvement.’ (Department of Health, 1997, p24).  
Then in 2000, the first major report on preventing harm in UK healthcare, 
entitled ‘An Organisation with a Memory’ was issued (Department of Health, 
2000), at the same time as the seminal report in the USA, ‘To Err is Human’ 
(Kohn et al., 2000). This led to considerable attention on how to improve safety 
in healthcare, drawing on what was known in industries outside healthcare 
(Shojania et al., 2001, Department of Health, 2000, Kohn et al., 2000, Vincent, 
2011, Amalberti et al., 2006, Kennedy, 2001). How to transfer this learning into 
the NHS and achieve widespread and sustainable organisational change 
presented both a practical and a research challenge in the early 2000s leading 
to the research set out in this thesis.  
 
1.2. Definition of terms relating to safety in organisations 
The terms used in this thesis relating to safety, errors and accidents are set out 
in appendix 2, together with the terms used in safety research. Here, the most 
frequently encountered terms and concepts will be considered in more detail. 
1.2.1. Safety  
Safety research and improvement in healthcare, as in industry, has required the 
contribution of a combination of disciplines. Understanding the causes of errors 
and accidents has involved the study topics such as communication, teamwork, 
decision making, situation awareness, stress, and fatigue, known collectively as 
‘human factors’ (Flin et al., 2008). The challenge of improving patient safety in 
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organisations has drawn also on quality improvement (QI) methodologies and 
an understanding of what underpins high quality care. Furthermore, clinical 
epidemiology has provided ‘a vital empirical understanding of the incidence and 
characteristics of error and patient harm’ (Walshe and Boaden, 2005. p2). The 
study of patient safety, therefore, has brought clinical research together with 
design, engineering, sociology, psychology and research into systems, 
organisation and change management. All are involved, in varying degrees, in 
the research presented here. 
1.2.2. Quality or safety? 
The relationship between quality and safety in healthcare has been debated for 
many years (Woolf, 2004). In this thesis, the term ‘quality’ is defined as being 
made up of a combination of patient safety, clinical effectiveness, and patient 
experience dimensions (Darzi, 2008). This definition was used in the QUASER 
study (Robert et al., 2011) (papers 8-11 in this thesis).   
 
1.3. Context for the research 
In order to provide focus for the research question, this section begins by 
considering what is meant by organisational and systems factors in patient 
safety, and how they can be classified. Previous related research is then 
discussed, including the knowledge gaps, and why the research set out in 
this thesis was needed. 
1.3.1. Defining and Classifying Organisational and Systems 
Factors in Patient Safety Research 
Organisational and systems factors encompass aspects of an organisation 
such as culture, leadership, infrastructure, and resources (Vincent et al., 
2000, Rundmo et al., 1998, Simard and Marchand, 1995). Here, they are 
used to describe the internal and external characteristics of an organisation 




During WW2, for the first time, physiologists and psychologists began working 
together on the design of aircraft and submarines, described as ‘human factors’ 
studies of the man-machine interface (Meister, 1999). Rather than focusing just 
on individuals, these studies began to consider errors as being caused by the 
systems in which people worked, and that these systems could be designed to 
reduce or eliminate certain errors (Guarnieri, 1992, Ilan and Fowler, 2005). 
Findings from this work began to be applied in industries where safety was 
paramount, such as civil aviation and nuclear power - the so called ‘safety 
conscious’ or ‘high risk’ industries. 
In the late 1990s, the NHS began to draw on this research to provide further 
understanding of the systems failures underpinning major patient safety failures. 
In 1997, clinicians and researchers in the UK began to consider how to apply 
techniques used in other industries to healthcare, to investigate and analyse 
incidents and accidents (Stanhope et al., 1997). From this, a classification 
system was developed for the influencing or contributory factors, called ‘the 
London Protocol’ (Vincent et al., 2000, Taylor-Adams et al., 2004), set out in 
figure 1. The structuring of these factors provided a basis for understanding 
systems failures and enabled those investigating adverse events in hospitals to 
classify problems and begin to develop solutions.  
The classification in figure 1 was used to structure the research and 
analysis of in papers 4-7 in this thesis. 
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Figure 1: The London Protocol for classifying the contributory factors in 
healthcare adverse events (Taylor-Adams et al., 2004) 
Factor Types Influencing/Contributory Factors 
Institutional Context Economic and regulatory context 
National health service executive 
Clinical negligence scheme for trusts 
Organisational and 
Management Factors 
Financial resources and constraints 
Organisational structure 
Policy standards and goals 
Safety culture and priorities 
Work Environment 
Factors 
Staffing levels and skills mix 
Workload and shift patterns 
Design, availability and maintenance of 
equipment 
Administrative and managerial support 
Team Factors Verbal communication 
Written communication 
Supervision and seeking help 
Team structure (congruence, consistency, 
leadership etc.) 
Individual (staff) Factors Knowledge and skills 
Competence 
Physical and mental health 
Task Factors Task design and clarity of structure 
Availability and use of protocols 
Availability and accuracy of test results 
Patient Factors Condition (complexity and seriousness) 
Language and communication 




Building on this, in a study reported in 2008, Bate and colleagues 
described, and usefully grouped into ‘challenges’, the organisational 
factors that had a bearing on success in quality improvement in healthcare 
organisations (Bate et al., 2008) (figure 2). This classification of 
organisational factors was updated following a literature review and used 
to structure the research in papers 8-11 in this thesis.  
 
Figure 2: Organisational challenges in quality improvement (Bate et al., 
2008, Robert et al., 2011) 
1. Structural – structuring, planning and co-ordinating quality efforts 
2. Political – addressing the politics and negotiating the buy-in, 
conflict and relationships of change surrounding any quality 
improvement effort 
3. Cultural – giving ‘quality’ a shared, collective meaning, value and 
significance within the organisation 
4. Educational – creating and nurturing a learning process that 
supports continuous improvement 
5. Emotional – inspiring, energizing, and mobilizing people for the 
quality improvement effort 
6. Physical and technological – designing physical systems and 
technological infrastructures that support improvement and quality 
of care. 
In research into change management, these organisation and systems 
factors, described collectively as ‘context’, have been found to be 
important:  
‘..experience suggests that ‘context counts’ for how easy it is to 
implement a safety intervention.’ (Øvretveit et al., 2011. p609)  
‘Context’ has also been described as ‘everything that is not the 
intervention’ (Stevens and Shojania, 2011. p557). In addition to the internal 
characteristics, these factors may also include the external or macro level 
system factors within which an organisation operates, for example the 
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social, political, economic, and regulatory context and the processes or 
interactions between these features (Paul Bate, 2014, Pettigrew et al., 
1992, Pettigrew, 1988).  
The research resulting in the publications in this thesis examined these 
organisational and systems factors in relation to patient safety and to 
patient safety improvement strategies and initiatives. 
1.3.2. Research into the organisational and systems factors 
underpinning successful change   
It is clear from the range of organisational factors found to contribute to 
accidents and incidents described in the London Protocol (figure 1), that efforts 
to improve patient safety will involve change across an organisation. In the 
period leading up to the research in this thesis, little research evidence existed 
regarding the effectiveness of improvement programs that targeted the whole 
organisation (Øvretveit et al., 2002, Shojania and Grimshaw, 2005, Mittman, 
2004). Therefore, when, in the early 2000s, for the first time in the UK, work 
began to translate and apply lessons in safety improvement from industry into 
the NHS, research was needed to capture the lessons and to gain an 
understanding of the steps needed to develop safer healthcare organisations 
(papers 1-3). 
At that time, studies investigating organisational change in healthcare had 
reported certain organisational factors as vital prerequisites for success, 
referred to as ‘organisational readiness’ (Weiner et al., 2008, Madsen et al., 
2005, Weiner, 2009). These readiness factors included: senior management 
and board commitment, clinicians engagement in quality improvement, quality 
reporting processes, and fostering processes for improvement that engaged 
front line staff (Gollop et al., 2004, Vaughn et al., 2006, Walley et al., 2006). 
Indeed, research had suggested that half of all failures to implement large scale 
change were due to organisational leaders failing to establish the right 




On the negative side, periods of uncertainty, for example trust mergers and 
management changes, were found to have a detrimental influence on the 
course and success of change programmes (Wezel and Saka-Helmhout, 2006, 
Fulop et al., 2005). Pettigrew described these as ‘receptive’ and ‘non-receptive’ 
contexts for change (Pettigrew et al., 1992, Pettigrew, 1988).  
In summary, previous research suggested that a better appreciation of an 
organisation’s readiness factors was likely to increase the chance of change 
succeeding (Jennett et al., 2003, Barrett et al., 2005, Penland, 1997). In 
addition, the failure of a programme may not be due to the intervention itself, 
but to the existing conditions in the organisations within which it was introduced. 
Investigating organisational readiness was therefore important in this thesis to 
understand the course of an improvement programme. Furthermore, no 
previous research had been conducted into the factors underpinning success in 
safety improvement programmes in the NHS. 
1.3.3. The impact of the external environment on safety and quality 
improvement 
In the London Protocol (figure 1), the institutional context is one of the factors 
found in research to contribute to adverse events in healthcare (Taylor-Adams 
et al., 2004). Hospitals exist within a wider socio-political environment and are 
influenced in what they do by a range of external organisations (Mendel and 
Richard, 2010). In the UK, these include the Department of Health; the Care 
Quality Commission (CQC); the Medical Royal Colleges; and the National 
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE). Each organisation has its 
own priorities for delivery by healthcare organisations and as such, each puts 
different demands on hospitals.  
Institutional theory provides conceptual frameworks for examining these 
competing demands, and for assessing the reactions of organisations to these 
pressures (Scott, 2004). Here, the structure and distribution of power among 
such institutional actors is considered an important determinant of how hospitals 
respond to external expectations (see figure 3). Where there are a multiple 
influential institutions, but where each has insufficient power to clearly dominate, 
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the leadership task in hospitals is considered even more complex (Ruef and 
Scott, 1998).  
Figure 3: Power structure of fields as characterised by the degree of 
centralisation (adapted from Pache and Santos, 2010) 
Highly centralised 
fields 
Typically rely on one principal constituent whose 
authority in the field is both formalised and 
recognised.(Meyer et al., 1987) This principal 
constituent can resolve disagreements between 
disparate players and impose relatively coherent 
demands on organisations 
Moderately centralised 
fields 
Characterised by the competing influence of multiple 
and misaligned players whose influence is not 
dominant yet is potent enough to be imposed on 
organisations 
Decentralised fields Institutional pressures are rather weak and, when 
incompatible, they can be easily ignored or challenged 
by organisations since the referents have little ability 
to monitor or enforce them. 
Other institutional analysts have highlighted how organisational responses to 
external institutional pressures and resource dependencies may vary across 
contexts and how organisational leaders exercise a range of strategic choices 
(Clemens and Cook, 1999). One model, outlining organisational responses to 
institutional demands and resource dependencies, identified a continuum that 
ranged from acquiescence, through to defiance and manipulation (see figure 4) 
(Oliver, 1991).   
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Figure 4: Responses to institutional pressures: strategies and tactics (adapted 
from Oliver, 1991)  
• Acquiescence refers to how organisations comply with institutional 
demands whether consciously or unconsciously arising from habit, 
imitation or voluntary accession.  
• Compromise refers to where an organisation partially conforms to 
institutional demands by either adjusting those institutional demands and 
/or adjusting internal organisational responses. Compromise may arise 
by applying one of three strategies: balancing competing expectations 
via negotiating with internal groups; allocating energies to pacify those 
resisting; or, to bargain with external institutions external demands. 
• Avoidance strategies involve attempts by the organisation to adjust 
conditions so as to make it possible for the organisation to comply with 
institutional demands. Avoidance tactics include: concealing non-
conformity by pretending to acquiesce; by preventing technical 
monitoring of compliance (buffering); or by changing the organisational 
function so as to make compliance unnecessary (escaping).  
• A defiant strategy may occur when the organisation rejects at least one 
institutional demand and may be manifested as dismissal of a demand, 
overtly challenging a requirement or aggressively attacking the 
institutional demand.  
• A manipulation strategy refers to the deliberate attempt to actively 
change the content of institutional demands. Manipulation tactics include: 
co-opting sources of institutional pressure; influencing norms by active 
lobbying; and, control of the source of pressure. 
With patient safety growing in prominence in the UK, since the publication of 
‘Building a Safer NHS’ (Department of Health, 2001) (appendix 1), pressure to 
improve was placed on hospitals through a range of external organisations 
(Department of Health, 2009), including the mainstream media (Boyce et al., 
2009). In the period from 2010, following the Great Recession, austerity 
measures were introduced (Jones and Charlesworth, 2013) with hospitals 
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required to achieve financial balance at the same time as improving patient 
safety. By then, research had shown the importance of understanding the nature 
and impact of the external context on healthcare organisations work to improve 
safety and quality. The QUASER study (papers 8-11) was the first research to 
examine the impact of the external context on healthcare organisations across 
European countries. The QUASER research included an analysis of how quality 
was conceptualised by different external and internal stakeholders, and how 
external pressures were managed, providing advice to hospitals, payers and 
policy makers (Robert et al., 2011, Burnett et al., 2013, Burnett et al., 2016, Wiig 
et al., 2014). 
1.3.4. Organisational Culture and Patient Safety 
Within the safety literature, a number of organisational characteristics are 
described as necessary if errors and adverse events are to be minimised, 
known collectively as a ‘safety culture’ (Weaver et al., 2013, Morello et al., 
2013, Vincent, 2011, Flin et al., 2008). These factors, for example teamwork 
and communication, form part of the classification within the London Protocol 
(figure 1), used in the studies set out in papers 4-7. This section provides a brief 
overview of culture in this context.  
Morello et al. (2013) define a patient safety culture as follows: 
‘Patient safety culture... includes the shared beliefs, attitudes, values, norms 
and behavioural characteristics of employees and influences staff member 
attitudes and behaviours in relation to their organisation’s ongoing patient 
safety performance.‘ (Morello et al., 2013. p11) 
The need to shift the culture within healthcare, from individual blame to a 
collective culture that is open and fair, was recognised in the early work on 
errors in medicine (Department of Health, 2000, Leape, 1994, Kohn et al, 2000). 
Here, it was recognised that the culture needed to be one where staff felt able 
to speak up about adverse events so that the systems factors could be explored 
and improvements made. This formed part of the early work of the UK National 
Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) when set up in 2001 (Milligan and Dennis, 2005, 
NPSA, 2004). It continues to be a challenge in healthcare, in particular in 
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balancing accountability for safety with the need to move away from an 
individual blame culture (Wachter and Pronovost, 2009, Vincent, 2011).  
1.3.5. Leadership and patient safety 
Following the investigation into the sinking of the Herald of Free Enterprise ferry 
in 1987 (Sheen, 1987), interest in the role of the wider organisation in major 
accidents began to grow (Reason, 1997, Cox and Flin, 1998, Flin, 2003, O'Dea 
and Flin, 2001) including the role played by senior leaders (Kennedy and 
Kirwan, 1995, Quarantelli, 1987).  
Several studies outside healthcare had shown management's commitment and 
involvement in safety work to be the factor of most importance for a satisfactory 
safety level (Cohen, 1977, Smith et al., 1978): 
Evidence of a strong management commitment to safety and of 
frequent, close contacts between workers, supervisors, and 
management on safety matters loom as the two most influential and 
dominant factors [in successful occupational safety programmes] 
(Cohen, 1977. p78) 
Leadership engagement had also been found to be important in the success of 
quality improvement programmes in healthcare (Berwick et al., 1990, Bradley et 
al., 2003, Walley et al, 2006). However, the Safer Patients Initiative (paper 2 in 
this thesis (Burnett et al., 2008)) was the first intervention in the UK to directly 
engage healthcare executive leaders in patient safety at the clinical frontline 
through ‘patient safety leadership walkrounds’.    
Patient safety executive walkrounds had been introduced in 2001 as part of a 
strategy to improve patient safety across a large integrated health care system 
in the USA (Frankel et al., 2003) with the aims set out in figure 5: 
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Figure 5: Aims of Patient Safety Executive/Leadership Walkrounds 
• Demonstrate top level commitment to patient safety 
• Establish lines of communication about patient safety among 
employees, executives, and managers 
• Provide opportunities for senior executives to learn about patient safety 
• Identify opportunities for improving safety 
• Encourage reporting of issues, errors and near misses 
• Promote a culture for change pertaining to patient safety 
• Establish local solutions to minimise risk 
Prior to the research set out in this thesis (paper 2) there had been no research 
in the NHS on Patient Safety Leadership Walkrounds, nor had previous 
research reported the complex social processes that underpin this intervention.  
The importance of the Chief Executive providing clear and committed 
leadership for patient safety to be an organisational priority was set out by 
Vincent (2012). However prior to the QUASER study (papers 8-11) there was 
no previous research on how this might be enacted, particularly at a time of 
austerity. Hence the role of senior leaders in quality and safety improvement 
was investigated in the QUASER study, considering their roles in mediating and 
translating external pressures for quality, safety and financial balance (see 
section 1.3.4).  
Moving from the executive to leadership within clinical micro-systems, local 
clinical and team leadership has been found in research to be important for new 
safety practices to be adopted (Greenhalgh et al., 2004). It has also been found 
to be important for safety procedures to be followed, notably the WHO Safer 
Surgery Checklist (Vats et al., 2010, Conley et al., 2011, Russ et al., 2015). This 
aspect of leadership was analysed in the study of wrong site and wrong 
procedure surgery, reported here in paper 7.  
1.3.6. Reliability and Patient Safety 
In the safety conscious industries of aviation and nuclear power, the importance 
of systems reliability for safety was recognised at an early stage and acted 
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upon, with impressive results (Amalberti et al., 2005). In studies in the USA, the 
delivery of recommended clinical care had been found to be unreliable 
(McGlynn et al., 2003, Asch et al., 2006, Resar, 2006). For example, in the 
McGlynn study patients were found only to receive about half of the 
recommended care processes required for their treatment. However, in the 
period leading up to the research set out in papers 4-6 the size and nature of 
poor reliability in the NHS was not known. Importantly, the impact of poor 
reliability on patient safety and patient care was also unknown.    
 
1.4. Summary and rationale for the research presented in this thesis 
Clearly, patient safety is a topic with a long history, however it was not until the 
1990s that the subject came to greater prominence, when hospitals were asked 
to implement systems of risk management. At this time, research into patient 
safety began to grow, with lessons being learned from safety in other industries. 
In the early 2000s, for the first time in the UK, work began to translate these 
lessons in the NHS. Research was needed to gain an understanding of the 
steps needed to develop safer healthcare. The findings from this (papers 1-3) 
indicated that there was relatively poor clinical systems reliability and that this 
may lead to poor patient safety. Research then ensued to discover the nature, 
extent and impact of poor clinical systems reliability (papers 4-6). Despite much 
work to improve patient safety, reports persisted about cases of wrong site and 
wrong procedure surgery and there was a need to understand why. Using 
experience gained in the earlier research, an analysis was conducted of the 
investigation reports of 9 such cases (paper 7). The research was then 
extended to consider the issues regarding safety and quality in 10 hospitals in 5 




1.5. The research question and aims  
The overarching research question investigated in the publications in this thesis 
is: What are the key organisational and systems factors that impact on patient 
safety, and how can these best be researched?  
Specifically, the aims were to:  
• Investigate the implementation and impact of patient safety improvement 
interventions in UK hospitals and the factors associated with successful 
outcomes 
• Explore the nature and extent of poor patient safety in the UK NHS and 
specifically, the factors contributing to the persistence of cases of wrong 
site and wrong procedure surgery  
• Extend the research to explore and compare safety and quality in 
hospitals in 5 European countries  
• To consider the methodological approaches and the challenges of 
research in practice to inform future research in this area  
1.6. Overview of methodology  
The research studies resulting in the publications in this thesis have involved a 
range of approaches to reflect the multi-dimensional nature and complexity of 
the interventions and organisations being studied. A multi-method, longitudinal 
research design was utilised to investigate the implementation and impact of a 
complex safety intervention in NHS hospitals and which resulted in papers 1-3.  
Mixed qualitative and quantitative methods were also used in the research into 
clinical systems reliability and patient safety in papers 4-6. Paper 7 involved a 
human factors analysis. A multi-method, longitudinal design was used in 
extending the research from the UK to five European countries (papers 8-11) 
involving analysis of quantitative aggregated data, semi-structured interviews, 
non-participant observation and an in-depth, multilevel analysis using 




2. The research studies and publications  
The publications presented in this thesis consist of 10 peer-reviewed journal 
papers (papers 1-3, 5-11) and a published research monograph (paper 4). In 
this section, each publication is described briefly, setting out the role and 
contribution of the author (SJB) and the contribution to knowledge. A tabulation 
of the methods for each study is provided in appendix 3. A synthesis of the 
findings and an evaluation and reflection on the methods is presented in section 
3.     
 
2.1. Publications arising from the ‘Safer Patients Initiative’ (SPI) 
programme, a complex safety intervention in NHS hospitals  
In 2004, the Health Foundation (HF) funded a large scale, four year safety 
improvement programme in 24 UK hospitals. A multi-method, longitudinal 
research design was utilised to investigate the implementation and impact of 
this programme. The papers arising from this research are described below 
(papers 1, 2, and 3).  
Paper 1: Burnett, S., Benn, J., Pinto, A., Parand, A., Iskander, S. and 
Vincent, C. (2010) Organisational readiness: exploring the preconditions 
for success in organisation-wide patient safety improvement 
programmes. Quality and Safety in Health Care, 19(4): 313-317.  
Brief description: A mixed methods study involving a survey and semi-
structured interviews with senior leaders in the NHS 
Role and contribution: SJB contributed to the design and management of 
the study; conducting interviews; analysed the qualitative data for the paper; 
and contributed towards the quantitative analysis. SJB wrote the paper 
incorporating comments from co-authors.  
Contribution to knowledge: This paper represented the first attempt to 
understand organisational readiness factors in the UK NHS in the context of 
a large scale safety improvement programme. It revealed that a better 
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understanding of the preconditions within an organisation would inform 
setting realistic expectations of the outcomes of such safety initiatives in 
future.  
Paper 2: Burnett, S., Parand, A., Benn, J., Pinto, A., Iskander, S. and 
Vincent, C. Learning about leadership from Patient Safety WalkRounds. 
(2008) The International Journal of Clinical Leadership. 16(4): 185-192. 
Brief description: a qualitative study involving a purposive sample of 56 
clinical, operational or management leads from 20 organisations. 
Role and contribution: SJB contributed to the design and management of 
the study; conducted interviews; and analysed the qualitative data for the 
paper, with input from a second researcher to ensure consistency of coding. 
SJB wrote the paper, incorporating comments from co-authors.  
Contribution to knowledge: The findings provided an understanding of the 
concerns of NHS healthcare executives regarding patient safety. It provided 
evidence of the benefits brought about by leadership engagement in safety, 
and the need for a structured process to enable leaders to connect with 
clinicians in their organisations on the subject of patient safety.   
Paper 3: Benn, J., Burnett, S., Parand, A., Pinto, A., Iskander, S. and 
Vincent, C. (2009) Studying large-scale programmes to improve patient 
safety in whole care systems: challenges for research. Social science & 
medicine, 69(12): 1767-1776. 
Brief description: An evaluation of the effectiveness of a multi-method 
approach to research into complex, patient safety-focused interventions and 
the challenges encountered. 
Role and contribution of SJB: As second author, SJB worked with Dr Benn 
on the paper, contributing to the ideas and the content of the paper. 
Contribution to knowledge: This research was the first time such a 
complex organisation-wide intervention to improve patient safety had been 
investigated and the methods reported in this way. Evaluation of the methods 
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informed recommendations for future research on the impact of long-term, 
large-scale complex interventions. 
 
2.2. Publications arising from a study of the reliability of clinical 
systems in seven UK NHS organisations (the WISER study) 
Routine data collected during SPI indicated that care was not being delivered 
reliably and that this was an issue for patient safety. The purpose of the 
research was to discover the extent and nature of poor reliability in acute care 
hospitals in the UK; to understand the impact this may have on patient care and 
patient safety; and to find the organisational factors that contributed to this.  
Paper 4: Burnett, S., Franklin, B.D., Moorthy, K., Cooke, M.W. and Vincent, 
C. (2011) Evidence: How safe are clinical systems? London: The Health 
Foundation.  
Brief description: Full research report on an investigation into the effect of 
clinical systems reliability on patient safety in UK hospitals.  
Role and contribution of SJB: SJB contributed to the design, analysis and 
management of the study, and wrote one chapter in this research report with 
comments incorporated from co-authors. SJB also provided comments for 
other chapters in the report, in particular for the discussion section set out in 
chapter 9. 
Contribution to knowledge: This study was the first time reliability had been 
systematically studied in the UK NHS. It described the nature, type, extent 
and variation in the reliability of five healthcare systems that have the 
potential to cause harm to patients in UK hospitals, comparing findings 
across hospitals. The study revealed the extent to which important clinical 




Paper 5: Burnett, S., Franklin, B.D., Moorthy, K., Cooke, M.W. and Vincent, 
C. (2012) How reliable are clinical systems in the UK NHS? A study of 
seven NHS organisations. BMJ Quality & Safety. 21(6): 466-472.  
Brief description: A prospective, descriptive study of the reliability of four 
clinical systems involving a mixed method approach (quantitative 
assessment of data plus semi-structured interviews with key personnel). 
Role and contribution of SJB: SJB contributed to the design, analysis and 
management of the study, and wrote the paper with comments incorporated 
from co-authors. 
Contribution to knowledge: This study was the first time reliability had been 
studied in the UK NHS, covering different clinical systems and comparing 
findings across hospitals. It revealed that overall reliability was low for the 
four systems, but there was significant variation between organisations. One 
in five reliability failures were linked with threats to patient safety.  
Paper 6: Burnett, S.J., Deelchand, V., Franklin, B.D., Moorthy, K. and 
Vincent, C. (2011) Missing Clinical Information in NHS hospital outpatient 
clinics: prevalence, causes and effects on patient care. BMC Health 
Services Research. 11(1):114. 
Brief description: A prospective, descriptive study of the reliability of clinical 
information availability in NHS hospital outpatient clinics involving a mixed 
method approach (quantitative assessment of data plus semi-structured 
interviews with key personnel). 
Role and contribution of SJB: SJB was the lead for this research, 
contributing to the design and management, and analysing the qualitative 
and quantitative data. SJB wrote the paper with comments incorporated from 
co-authors. 
Contribution to knowledge: This study was the first time the reliability of 
clinical information in outpatient clinics had been systematically studied and 
reported in the UK. It revealed that 1 in 7 of surgical outpatient consultations 
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had key items of clinical information missing and that a fifth of these had a 
threat to patient safety. The underlying causes of missing information were 
reported for the first time. 
 
2.3. An analysis of the causes of wrong site and wrong procedure 
surgery in the NHS in England  
The NHS in England has set out a list of patient safety incidents that cause 
severe harm or death and where guidance exists to prevent these, called ‘Never 
Events’. Building on the research presented in papers 1-6 above, and now 
presented in paper 7, research was conducted into the human and 
organisational factors underpinning two such ‘Never Events’: wrong site surgery 
and wrong procedure cases.  
Paper 7: Burnett, S., Norris, B. and Flin, R. (2012) Never events: the 
cultural and systems issues that cannot be addressed by individual action 
plans. Clinical Risk, 18(6): 213-216. 
Brief description: A qualitative study of hospital investigation reports into 
cases of wrong procedure and wrong site surgery in the NHS.  
Role and contribution of SJB:  SJB conducted the qualitative analysis of 
the anonymised investigation reports of the root causes of nine cases of 
wrong site or wrong procedure surgery. SJB wrote the paper incorporating 
amendments from co-authors.  
Contribution to knowledge: This was the first time that reports from 
investigations into wrong procedure and wrong site surgery (so called ‘Never 
Events’) had been analysed, reported, and made widely accessible to 
frontline clinical teams. The paper discusses the factors that need to be 




2.4. Publications arising from an investigation into the factors 
impacting on quality and safety in ten hospitals in five European 
countries (the QUASER study) 
The QUASER study widened the research reported in the papers set out above, 
to five European countries (England, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and 
Sweden). The aim of study was to explore the relationships between the 
organisational and cultural characteristics of hospitals and how these impact 
upon clinical effectiveness, patient safety and patient experience in European 
countries. 
Paper 8: Robert, G.B., Anderson, J.E., Burnett, S.J., Aase, K., Andersson-
Gare, B., Bal, R., Calltorp, J., Nunes, F., Weggelaar, A.-M., Vincent, C.A. 
and Fulop, N. (2011) A longitudinal, multi-level comparative study of 
quality and safety in European hospitals: the QUASER study protocol. 
BMC health services research, 11(1): 285. 
Brief description: The paper describes the research protocol for the 
QUASER study, setting out the concepts and the methods used. 
Role and contribution of SJB: SJB contributed to research design and 
provided comments to the lead author for this paper.  
Contribution to knowledge: see papers below. 
Paper 9: Burnett, S., Renz, A., Wiig, S., Fernandes, A., Weggelaar, A.M., 
Calltorp, J., Anderson, J.E., Robert, G., Vincent, C. and Fulop, N. (2013) 
Prospects for comparing European hospitals in terms of quality and 
safety: lessons from a comparative study in five countries. International 
journal for quality in health care. 25(1): 1-7 
Brief description: A report on the study to find common process and 
outcome indicators to compare hospitals for quality and safety in five 
countries (England, Portugal, The Netherlands, Sweden and Norway). 
Role and contribution of SJB: SJB led the research; conducted the 
analysis; and wrote the paper, incorporating comments from co-authors. 
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Contribution to knowledge: The paper described the challenges faced 
across Europe if patients and policymakers are to compare the quality and 
safety of hospitals, as set out in the 2011 European Union directive on 
patients rights to cross border health care (European Parliament, 2011). The 
findings were used to select the hospitals for the QUASER study.  
Paper 10: Burnett, S., Mendel, P., Nunes, F., Wiig, S., Van Den Bovenkamp, 
H., Karltun, A., Robert, G., Anderson, J., Vincent, C. and Fulop, N. (2016) 
Using institutional theory to analyse hospital responses to external 
demands for finance and quality in five European countries. Journal of 
health services research & policy, 21(2): 109-117. 
Brief description: Using institutional theory, a qualitative analysis of the data 
drawn from the multilevel analysis of health care quality policies and 
practices in ten hospitals in five European countries, exploring how hospital 
leaders manage the competing demands to improve quality and constrain 
spending.  
Role and contribution of SJB: SJB conducted the cross case analysis that 
led to this paper. SJB wrote the paper working with advice from and 
incorporating the comments of co-authors.  
Contribution to knowledge: This is the first time that institutional theory has 
been applied in this way to hospitals across Europe. The paper makes 
recommendations for policy makers and for hospital managers.  
Paper 11: Wiig, S., Aase, K., von Plessen, C., Burnett, S., Nunes, F., 
Weggelaar, A.M., Anderson-Gare, B., Calltorp, J. and Fulop, N. (2014) 
Talking about quality: exploring how ‘quality’ is conceptualized in 
European hospitals and healthcare systems. BMC Health Services 
Research, 14(1): 1-12. 
Brief description: A cross-national multi-level qualitative case study in ten 
hospitals in five European countries with data analysed from the national 




Role and contribution of SJB: SJB contributed to QUASER study design, 
including acquisition of data, within country analysis in England, and verified 
the cross country analysis and commented on manuscript drafts. 
Contribution to knowledge: The paper revealed for the first time, the 
different ways that quality (defined in the paper as clinical effectiveness, 
patient safety and patient experience) is conceptualised in Europe at different 
levels from the national to the local (macro, meso, micro); also among 
professional groups (nurses, doctors, managers); and between the different 






3.1. Synthesis of the findings 
This section brings together the findings from the 11 publications, described in 
section 2, to address the first part of the research question and related aims 
(see section 1.5), as follows: 
What are the key organisational and systems factors that impact on patient 
safety? 
Aims:  
• Investigate the implementation and impact of patient safety improvement 
interventions in UK hospitals and the factors associated with successful 
outcomes 
• Explore the nature and extent of poor patient safety in the UK NHS and 
specifically, the factors contributing to the persistence of cases of wrong 
site and wrong procedure surgery  
• Extend the research to explore and compare safety and quality in 
hospitals in 5 European countries  
Drawing on the Framework Method (Gale et al., 2013, Dixon-Woods, 2011), the 
findings from each publication were categorised, tabulated, and collated into 
themes. Three higher level themes emerged and the findings are grouped and 
discussed for each of these, as follows: organisational history/readiness for 
change; organisational culture; and systems and infrastructure.  
3.1.1. Organisational history/ readiness for change 
Evidence from prior research (see section 1.3.3) had found that a number of 
organisational conditions were necessary for large scale change programmes to 
be successful. These were specifically considered in the research in paper 1 but 
also drawn out in the findings from papers 4, 6 10 and 11.   
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3.1.1a Involvement in quality improvement work 
In the SPI programme (paper 1), hospitals that had been working on quality 
improvement for several years were described by staff as being ‘ready’ to 
engage in the changes required to improve patient safety. This was echoed in 
the hospitals in the QUASER research (paper 10), where a history of active 
work on quality and safety improvement was found to enable a more long term 
strategic approach to embedding these activities in everyday work.  
How staff perceived the purpose of the improvement work and how it was 
aligned with other priorities was found to be particularly important (papers 1, 10 
and 11). For example, in some QUASER and SPI hospitals, staff described too 
many unconnected improvement initiatives underway, which created overload 
and change fatigue. In some SPI hospitals (paper 1) this overload had led to 
doctors becoming disengaged, lacking motivation to participate in new 
improvement programmes, particularly when earlier initiatives had failed to be 
completed. This echoes the findings from Kotter (Kotter, 1996) where a history 
of successful change is likely to encourage staff to engage in such change in 
the future. In the QUASER research (papers 10 and 11) the work of senior 
leaders was found to be important in (a) negotiating achievable quality goals 
with external organisations and (b) internally aligning these goals with other 
targets and priorities.   
3.1.1b Managing external pressures 
Meeting required external targets, for example for waiting times and cost 
reduction, was found to be important for quality and safety work (papers 1 and 
10). Of particular importance was the degree to which hospitals were under 
financial pressure and how this was being managed. Findings from the 
QUASER research (paper 10) grouped hospital responses to financial 
pressures compared to their work on quality and safety. These ranged from 
immediate pressure to make savings in the short term to long term approaches 
to aligning cost and quality. In the hospitals that were in financial difficulties, the 
measures taken to achieve savings in the short term were often at the expense 
of work to improve quality and safety, for example staffing levels and training 
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programmes were cut. Reduced staffing levels were found to be an important 
factor in creating error provoking conditions in the WISER and the Never Events 
studies (papers 4, 5, 6, and 7). In the WISER study (papers 4, 5, and 6), staff 
shortages led to locum staff working in services where they were not familiar 
with the existing systems. In the Never Events study (paper 7), staff shortages 
were found to create unrealistic work pressures, giving rise to short-cuts and 
work-arounds.  
3.1.1c Mergers and restructuring 
In the WISER and QUASER studies (papers 4, 5, 6 and 10), organisational 
restructuring and hospital mergers were found to have an impact on safety and 
quality. These reorganisations had often led to leadership instability where staff 
described quality as slipping off the agenda in the face of other pressures 
(paper 10).  Having a stable management team that had been in post for 
several years was associated with increased attention on quality and safety 
work (papers 1, 6, 10). For example, in the SPI sites, organisational stability 
was described as enabling leaders to focus their attention on patient safety and 
on improvement work, rather than being distracted by other more pressing 
priorities (paper 1).  
In addition hospitals that had gone through mergers often had not adequately 
merged key systems. For example, in the WISER research (papers 4, 5 and 6) 
after mergers, hospitals were left with multiple IT systems, not communicating 
with each other and hence not transmitting key patient information in a timely 
manner. This made information retrieval difficult and surgeons were faced with 
making important clinical decisions in the absence of key patient information 
(paper 6).  
3.1.2. Organisational Culture 
The culture of an organisation is defined by the systems, assumptions, values, 
and beliefs, which govern how staff behave (see section 1.3.4). Various aspects 
of organisational culture were found to have an impact on the safety of care in 
all the publications presented here, and these factors are now described.  
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3.1.2a Leadership and management  
Leadership engagement in quality and safety was found to be an important 
organisational factor in papers 1, 2, 7, 10 and 11. Where senior leaders were in 
contact with frontline staff on a regular basis, staff described being able to 
discuss safety issues with them, and this in turn was found to influence top level 
decision making. Influencing how leaders conceptualise quality was found to be 
important in the QUASER study (paper 11).  
In organisations where improving quality and safety was delegated to the 
frontline, described as a ‘bottom up’ or empowering environment (papers 
1,2,10,11), staff described feeling able to implement change and, in these 
hospitals, change was more likely to succeed. In the QUASER study (paper 10), 
having a culture where quality and safety was everyone’s business was found 
to lead to safety being embedded in everyday work. By contrast in hospitals 
with a top-down style of leadership, middle managers described how this limited 
staff engagement in quality and safety improvement work, particularly the 
involvement of doctors.  
3.1.2b Accountability versus blame  
In the WISER study (papers 4, 5 and 6) where poor reliability was evident in 
clinical systems, the culture was one where staff blamed others for the failures 
and by doing so accepted the systems failures as normal in everyday work. This 
resulted in reluctance to report the failures, rather staff developed ways to work 
around the problems. These systems failures and the work arounds created 
error producing conditions. Similarly, in the studies of unsafe surgery in ‘Never 
Events’ (paper 7), acceptance of failures or problems in the system led to 
errors. Notably shortcuts to save time meant procedures designed for safe 
surgery were not followed and over time these shortcuts had become normal 
working practices which no one questioned.   
Staff may not speak up for fear of blame or due to the attitude of those in senior 
positions towards their juniors (Helmreich and Davies, 2004).  This was found to 
be a factor in the causes of unsafe surgery, for example junior staff often felt 
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unable to challenge those in senior positions when safety procedures were not 
followed (paper 7).  
3.1.2c Training 
Training was found to be important for safety and quality in the WISER and 
QUASER studies (papers 4, 5, 10). For clinical systems reliability, it was found 
to be important for staff to be trained and given a good induction into new areas 
where they were to work. Without this training and without familiarity in how the 
hospital systems worked, clinical systems were more likely to be unreliable. For 
example, untrained staff did not know where to find clinical information on 
computer systems and, in theatres, were unaware of the location of vital 
equipment.  
At the level of the whole hospital, in the QUASER research (paper 10), training 
in quality improvement methods for all staff was found to be important for 
ongoing QI work, and for the development of a learning culture. In hospitals that 
had invested in training staff in QI over many years, quality work was 
considered everybody’s business. By contrast, in hospitals where training was 
cancelled to save money, staff were found to have no external links to help with 
QI work and no ‘slack time’ to consider or undertake improvement activities.  
3.1.2d Teamwork and Communication  
The importance of good communication and the effects of poor communication 
on patient safety were reported in papers 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 and 11. For patient safety 
improvement to be seen as a priority in an organisation, this needs to be 
communicated from the board to the ward (papers 1, 2 and 11). For good 
decision making at board level about patient safety, it is important for those 
present to have a good understanding of the day to day safety concerns of 
frontline staff. Leadership walkrounds were found to be an effective mechanism 
for such communication (papers 2 and 11). 
Poor communication was found to lead to poor reliability and hence poor patient 
safety (papers 3, 6, 7). Examples here included poor documentation in medical 
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records, the use of abbreviations that were misunderstood, medical information 
not being available, and poor communication with patients. Poor communication 
within clinical teams was found to lead to errors in the work to understand the 
root causes of Never Events (paper 7). Examples of this included poor 
teamwork, and failures to speak up when known safety procedures were not 
followed.  
3.1.3. Systems and Infrastructure 
As set out in section 1.3.1, the systems and infrastructure of an organisation are 
potential contributory factors to poor safety. Papers 1, 4-7, and 10, provided 
further detail about how these factors impact on safety in healthcare.  
3.1.3a Complexity of processes versus standardisation 
In the paper on Leadership Walkrounds (paper 2), chief executives reported 
finding overly complex or bureaucratic processes for simple things within their 
organisation, that were previously unknown at a senior level.  
Both a lack of standardisation and overly complex processes were found to lead 
to poor clinical systems reliability and poor safety, in the WISER study (papers 4 
- 6) and the study of the causes of Never Events (paper 7). For example, in the 
study of missing clinical information (paper 6), overly complex processes for 
arranging and reporting tests (X-rays, CT and MRI scans, biopsies etc) meant 
that often these important results were not available when a patient returned to 
clinic for a decision about future treatment.  
Often standardisation has been introduced through new policies and 
procedures (paper 7).  How these were introduced and how they related to 
other existing policies and procedures was found to be important in whether 
they were followed , echoing other studies (Carthey et al., 2011). Not following 
these policies and procedures was at the root of several of the Never Events. 
Examples included not following procedures to mark an operation site; and not 
using the World Health Organisation safer surgery checklist. 
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3.1.3b Data Infrastructure and the Use of Measurement 
Poor data infrastructure was found to create error provoking conditions in the 
WISER study on the reliability of clinical systems (papers 4 and 6). Examples 
included key clinical information being unavailable at surgical outpatient 
appointments and for multi-disciplinary meetings to decide surgical options for 
cancer patients.  
In the SPI programme (paper 1), measures were introduced for all aspects of 
the change programme to enable participants to demonstrate success, or not, 
over time. Information systems for measurement were found to be inadequate 
at the start of the programme (paper 1). In addition staff described their 
knowledge and capacity to undertake the required measurement tasks as weak, 
at the start of the programme. This is important since the ability to demonstrate 
success has been found to be important for future success in change 
programmes (see section 1.3.2). Hospitals ability to demonstrate success in the 
delivery of high quality, safe care was examined as part of the QUASER study 
(papers 9, 10 and 11). A wide variation was found between countries in the data 
that was available to the public about care in hospitals. This ranged from 
Portugal where there was no public data available to the Netherlands and the 
England where there was a plethora of information available for the purposes of 
patient choice (paper 10).  
3.1.4. Summary of the organisational and systems factors 
underpinning safety improvement in healthcare  
In synthesising the findings across the eleven publications, the organisational 
and systems factors underpinning safety improvement in healthcare emerged, 
as follows: 
• leadership stability:  
• financial balance:  
• alignment of external and internal priorities:  
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• data infrastructure:  
• measurement capability: 
• standardisation of clinical systems: 
• creating an open and fair collective culture where poor safety is 
challenged: 
• training and induction: 
• teamwork and communication:  
This synthesis extends our understanding of the contributory factors of adverse 
events, as set out in the London Protocol (figure 1), specifically the institutional 
context and the organisation and management factors. It also adds to our 
understanding of the organisational challenges described by Bate et al (2008) 
(figure 2), in particular the cultural, educational, and the physical/technological 
challenges.  
 
3.2. Evaluation of and reflection on the methods used in the research: 
informing future research in this area  
In addition to the contribution to knowledge from the findings of the submitted 
publications, the research conducted also contributes to knowledge of how to 
investigate and capture relevant data for assessing implementation and impact 
of complex patient-safety and quality improvement programmes. This has been 
achieved through the publication in full of the research protocol for the large, 
European study (paper 8) and through the analysis of a multimodal, longitudinal 
approach as presented in paper 3. This paper analysed the specific challenges 
encountered and proposed recommendations for similar research programmes. 
In setting out the challenges, the paper has informed the methods for future 
studies (Krein et al., 2010, Øvretveit, 2009).   
In this section the main research challenges, encountered across the studies 
are discussed, with the specific aim (as set out in section 1.5) as follows: 
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• To consider the methodological approaches and the challenges of 
research in practice to inform future research in this area  
 
3.2.1a Defining and measuring success  
Defining and measuring success in patient safety presented a challenge for the 
research in three of the studies (papers 3, 4, and 10). In the SPI study (papers 
1, 2, 3) the 24 sites involved all had different starting positions, some being 
further ahead with quality improvement work and familiar with the data 
collection methods to be used during the intervention. As a result baseline 
measurement was more reliable in these hospitals, whilst being absent in 
others. This was a complex intervention across different clinical teams, involving 
different clinical areas and including senior leaders. As such there was no one 
definition of success for the intervention.    
In the WISER study (papers 4, 5, 6) the challenge was to define success in 
terms of clinical systems reliability for five different systems. This was the first 
time that reliability had been measured for these systems and hence the first 
time that reliability had to be defined for each.  
In the QUASER study (papers 8-11) there was inconsistency in the data 
available to assess healthcare organisations performance in quality and safety 
across the five different countries involved. In some countries also, there was 
variability and inconsistency in the methods, and robustness, of data collection 
in different hospitals, making comparisons between sites difficult. The 
challenges of this and how they were overcome are reported in paper 9.  
In each study, success had to be defined by the research team and in 
consensus with participants where appropriate. In the SPI study success was 
defined as to whether the programme continued to be rolled out and whether 
safety improvement data were still being collected and used. In the reliability 
study, consensus was reached with participants in each clinical system, 
applying the definition of reliability used in industry. In the QUASER study 
consensus was reached on the definition of quality in hospitals through 
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discussion between research teams, based on the data available in each 
country. 
In summary, success is not easy to define in safety and quality improvement 
research. Research teams need to take this into consideration when planning 
interviews and survey measures and where possible agree this in consensus 
with participants. 
 
3.2.1b Conducting longitudinal research  
Both the SPI (papers 1-3) and the QUASER (papers 8-11) studies involved 
longitudinal research at two time periods. In the first study the requirement was 
to re-survey and re-interview the same sample as at the first time point, over a 
year earlier. Multiple staff changes across all sites made this task difficult. In 
particular, those staff that had been successful in delivering the safety 
interventions had often been promoted to positions outside the organisation to 
assist others in similar work. 
In both studies, in the intervening period between the two time points, the sites 
had multiple external influences to improve quality and safety. Therefore, 
attribution of changes during this period to any one influence or intervention had 
to be considered. The design of the SPI study took this into account by focusing 
the interviews on the specific aspects of the interventions. In addition the survey 
measure asked specific questions about the intervention and was administered 
at each time point to the same cohort of people directly involved in the 
intervention. In the QUASER study, similarly the interview participants and 
questions were unchanged between time points, however here there were 
specific questions about external influences. In addition, a ‘tracer’ project 
related to infection control was tracked throughout the period of the research to 
capture and understand both the external and internal influences on 
improvement work. This included specific questions to participants and the 
tracking of guidance from external stakeholders, such as NICE.    
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In summary, it is important to consider how external influences will be captured 
and taken into consideration in longitudinal research into safety and quality 
improvement work. This may be through specific questions related to such 
influences, through the tracking of a specific issue, or through analysis of 
guidance issued by external stakeholders.     
 
3.2.1c Cross country research 
The QUASER study (papers 8-11) involved research teams in working in 5 
languages. This posed a challenge for the consistency and reliability of the 
fieldwork. Overcoming this required regular meetings, emails and phone calls 
between researchers. The analysis of the fieldwork and interviews was 
conducted in the language of the research team and the resulting country 
reports were translated into English as the working language. Additional work 
was required, between the research teams, to understand the key findings from 
each country report and to ensure they were correctly translated. Confirming 
meaning within the translated reports required work between research teams by 
email and at a research meeting, before the cross case analysis could begin. A 
wider advisory board and translational workshops also helped to test the 
emerging findings. From this it is evident that when conducting cross country 
research, time has to be built in to the study to allow for discussion between 
research teams, particularly during the analysis phase.  
 
3.3. Conclusions   
The publications presented in this thesis, reporting a series of research studies 
conducted in over 40 healthcare organisations, using mixed methods, have 
provided a better and more complete understanding of the organisation and 
systems factors underpinning safer healthcare. This includes the nature and 
extent of poor systems reliability and its effect on patient safety; the factors 
underpinning cases of patient harm; and the cultural issues impacting on safety 
and quality. The findings in the publications highlight the importance of a 
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common language for quality and safety across an organisation, and the how 
this can be achieved when healthcare leaders engage with frontline staff using 
a structured approach. The impact of external pressures on healthcare 
organisations have been described, with recommendations to policy makers 
relating to consideration of the difficulties experienced by hospitals in 
maintaining a focus on safety when in financial difficulty. The importance of 
aligning both external and internal requirements into an overarching safety 
strategy have been described, to ensure that staff are not overwhelmed by 
multiple, conflicting requirements. Finally the specific cultural and systems 
factors underpinning poor reliability and hence poor safety have been 
described, including the need for organisations to focus on improving teamwork, 
communications and data infrastructure. 
Considered together, the findings address the overarching question: What are 
the key organisational and systems factors that impact on patient safety, and 
how can these best be researched? The synthesis has also addressed the 
specific aims (section 1.5) as follows:  
• Investigate the implementation and impact of patient safety improvement 
interventions in UK hospitals and the factors associated with successful 
outcomes 
• Explore the nature and extent of poor patient safety in the UK NHS and 
specifically, the factors contributing to the persistence of cases of wrong 
site and wrong procedure surgery  
• Extend the research to explore and compare safety and quality in 
hospitals in 5 European countries  
• Consider the methodological approaches and the challenges of research 
in practice to inform future research in this area  
Each research study, and the associated analysis, required the development of 
appropriate methods to answer the research questions. The methods 
incorporated a range of approaches, both qualitative and quantitative, including 
interviews, surveys, documentary analysis and observation. One study involved 
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translation from 4 languages into English. Two studies were longitudinal. 
Analysis of the effectiveness of the methods used in practice revealed a number 
of challenges, including how to measure success in research across multiple 
organisations with different starting positions; how to assess ongoing external 
influences on organisations during longitudinal research into specific 
interventions; and how to ensure correct meaning and interpretation in 
translated research reports.   
3.3.1. Implications and impact in practice 
Each publication has had implications in practice. The SPI research (papers 1-
3) informed the next stage of work on patient safety by the Health Foundation 
as funders. Each of the subsequent national safety programmes included a 
component aimed at leaders of healthcare organisations, and the use of 
measurement for safety improvement (Department of Health, 2009, Welsh-
Government, 2008, Healthcare Improvement Scotland, 2008). The study of the 
reliability of clinical systems (papers 4-6) informed improvement work in each of 
the participating organisations, and a major programme of work to improve 
reliability in healthcare (The Health Foundation, 2014). The study of Never 
Events (paper 7) informed a national initiative in England to develop standards 
to prevent such events in future (NHS England, 2015a). Finally two guides were 
produced from the translational research in 5 European countries (papers 8-11), 
to aide hospital managers and commissioners to improve the quality and safety 
of healthcare (Fulop, 2013a, Fulop, 2013b). 
3.3.2. Implications for and impact on future research 
Synthesising the findings of the published papers presented in this thesis has 
revealed some potentially rewarding aspects for future research. For example:  
• Assessing the support required by hospital organisations to maintain 
focus on patient safety when going through periods of major change, or 
austerity (papers 4, 6 and 10).    
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• Assessing the skills needed for healthcare leaders to negotiate, align and 
translate multiple external and internal pressures into a coherent strategy 
for safe services (papers 10 and 11).  
• Understanding the extent and nature of poor data infrastructure in 
healthcare organisations and assessing the implications for patient safety 
(papers 1-7). 
The research methods used in the publications described in this thesis provide 
practical recommendations for these potential studies. For example, how to 
define ‘success’ when considering whether a hospital has maintained a focus 
on patient safety, during a period of major change, will require an assessment 
of the organisational pre-conditions (paper 1); reaching consensus with 
participants (papers 4-6); and from this the establishment of a baseline set of 
measures that can be tracked over time (papers 3, 4 and 9).  
3.3.3. Overall original contribution to knowledge 
The extent of patient harm from healthcare did not become a focus for study 
until the 1990s with the first major report on preventing harm in healthcare 
issued in 2000 (Department of Health, 2000). This led to considerable attention 
and effort to translate learning from the ‘safety conscious’ industries into the 
NHS. How to transfer this knowledge and achieve widespread, sustainable 
change was a challenge in the early 2000s and led directly to the research 
presented in this thesis. The publications have provided a better understanding 
of the key organisational and systems factors impacting on patient safety in 
acute care organisations. Moreover, the findings have since been used in 
practice to inform both local and national efforts to improve patient safety. 
Consideration and analysis of the research methods has provided insight into 
the application of different research methods in multi-site and longitudinal 
research in patient safety. Setting out the challenges encountered in this 





Overview of the history of risk, safety and patient safety 
The concept of medical harm is known to date back to 1754 BC when the 
Babylonian Code of Hammurabi set out the law that, if a surgeon killed a 
patient, his hand would be cut off (Wootton, 2006). The Hippocratic Oath, first 
sworn by doctors in the 5th Century BC, contained the clause  
I will apply dietetic measures for the benefit of the sick according to my ability 
and judgement; I will keep them from harm and injustice (Edelstein, 1943, in 
Veatch, 2000. p3) 
The concept of physicians as potential “poisoners”, for example, appears in 
Roman and early Islamic literature (Sharpe and Faden, 1998) and has been a 
topic in plays and books ever since, most notably in Shakespeare (1623), and 
Moliere (1667) (Wootton, 2006).  
Medical historians acknowledge that doctors had very little to offer patients until 
the late 19th century (Sharpe and Faden, 1998, Wootton, 2006). Indeed, it is 
known that the treatments that were available, such as mercury, arsenic, 
phosphorous and bloodletting, actually caused harm and patients died as a 
result. In the book Medical Harm, Sharpe and Faden (1998. p7) describe a 
treatise published in 1728, entitled “Doctors as the Cause of Illness”, where 
case studies were presented demonstrating the harmful effects of bloodletting. 
Nevertheless, with little else to offer, and with little understanding of the causes 
of illness, doctors continued to use it as a treatment until the end of the 19th 
century (Wootton, 2006).  
It was not until the discoveries of germs and germ theory by Lister and Pasteur 
(circa 1860) that historians acknowledge that medicine became more effective 
(Sharpe and Faden, 1998, Wootton, 2006). ‘Germ theory’ provided an 
understanding of the cause of infections and this led directly to the adoption of 
antiseptic techniques in surgery. This combined with the introduction of 
anaesthesia and later, the discovery, and wider use, of penicillin, gave rise to an 
increase in surgery. From 1900 onwards in the UK, more hospitals began to 
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open and gradually medicine began to be organised within and around these 
institutions.  
Historically, most accidents were seen as ‘acts of God’ (Loimer and Guarnieri, 
1996). However, in the 19th century, the prevailing view was that individuals 
were responsible for their own safety and, hence, guilty if injured by an accident 
and blamed if an error occurred (Ilan and Fowler, 2005, Guarnieri, 1992). 
Research into the causes of accidents until the 1930s was focussed on finding 
the psychological causes of accidents.(Guarnieri, 1992) As a result, many of 
those who spoke out about patients being harmed by their care were vilified by 
the medical profession since it was understood that they were laying the blame 
at the door of individual doctors.  
With the growth of surgery in the early part of the 20th century the first 
documented attempt was made to study the outcomes of surgery, including 
surgical errors. A well known American surgeon, Ernest Amory Codman began 
to collect data on the outcome of his surgery, called ‘end results’ which he 
published in a book (Codman, 1915b). He defined ’end results’ as:  
The common sense notion that every hospital should follow every patient it 
treats, long enough to determine whether or not the treatment has been 
successful, and then to inquire, “If not, why not?” with a view to preventing 
similar failures in the future. (Codman,1915a. In Gerrand and Rankin, 2014. 
p473-474)  
Codman’s efforts to understand surgical failures and to develop standards for 
operating theatres and hospitals performing surgery were rejected at the time. 
In the early part of the 20th century, medical harm was not on the agenda and 
certainly not for public discussion: 
E. Amory Codman received no appreciation in his lifetime. His efforts to 
reform medical science by starting the field of outcome studies and evidence-




Prior to the formation of the NHS, each hospital and local authority dealt with 
their own litigation and complaints. As such, there was no overall knowledge 
about patient harm in the UK. This continued after the establishment of the NHS 
in 1948, when systems for collecting national data about the use of hospital 
services developed, but these were limited (MacFaul, 1988) and focussed on 
throughput and performance.   
The first high profile case of widespread harm from healthcare in the UK 
occurred in 1961, when the drug Thalidomide was withdrawn from use following 
the discovery that it caused birth defects. Following this, there were a series of 
high profile public inquiries into poor quality care in hospitals such as at Ely, 
Farleigh, and South Ockenden (Walshe and Higgins, 2002, Mold, 2012). Then 
in 1976, Ivan Illich published ‘Limits to Medicine, Medical Nemesis: the 
Expropriation of Health’ (Illich, 1976b), setting out a reasoned argument that the 
medical establishment had become a major threat to the health of the 
population. In his critique, Illich (1976) cited the lack of evidence for high 
technology medicine, and doctor inflicted injuries, saying: 
The pain, dysfunction, disability, and anguish resulting from technical 
medical intervention now rival the morbidity due to traffic and industrial 
accidents and even war-related activities, and make the impact of 
medicine one of the most rapidly spreading epidemics of our time (Illich 
1976; p.35) 
Interest in medical harm began to grow and in 1980, the BBC screened a play 
entitled ‘Minor Complications’ about a real life story of a woman who had gone 
into hospital for a routine sterilisation by keyhole surgery (Ransley, 2015, Watts, 
2003) but had her bowel damaged during the procedure. The hospital had 
denied liability but, after persisting for years, the woman won compensation. 
Following this broadcast, the charity Action for Victims of Medical Accidents was 
set up in the UK and began to campaign on behalf of patients who had been 
harmed by their healthcare.  Soon after in 1983, in the UK, the BBC broadcast a 
series of Reith lectures by Ian Kennedy, subsequently published in ‘The 
Unmasking of Medicine’ (Kennedy, 1981). In their review of the book, the New 
Statesman magazine described the lectures and the book as a ‘hard hitting and 
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penetrating investigation behind the facade of contemporary medicine’ 
(Kennedy, 1981, book cover). By the mid 1980s, the potential for harm caused 
by healthcare was firmly on the public agenda in the UK. 
Public trust in the medical profession, in the UK, was dealt a further blow in the 
mid 1990s with the arrest of GP Dr Harold Shipman, for the murder of many of 
his patients, and the revelations about the high number of deaths of children 
from heart surgery in Bristol (Savage, 1998, Kennedy, 2001). This led to 
government intervention with a White Paper issued in 1997 introducing:  
‘a new system of clinical governance in NHS Trusts and primary care to 
ensure that clinical standards are met, and that processes are in place to 
ensure continuous improvement, backed by a new statutory duty for quality in 
NHS Trusts’ (Department of Health London, 1997. p24)  
This White Paper also led to risk management being introduced across the NHS 
(see later section on risk management in this overview). 
The outcome of the Bristol Inquiry (Kennedy, 2001) and the surrounding 
publicity was said in a BMJ editorial to have: 
... thrown up a long list of important issues that British medicine will take 
years to address. At the heart of the tragedy, which has been 
Shakespearean in its scale and structure, is, as the GMC said, “the trust 
that patients place in their doctors.” That trust will never be the same 
again, but that will be a good thing if we move to an active rather than a 
passive trust, where doctors share uncertainty. (Savage, 1998, p1917) 
Following a rise in medical negligence claims in the USA, in the 1980s, 
investigations began into the cause (Sharpe and Faden, 1998). A paper in 1994 
by a leading American physician, Lucian Leape, entitled Error in Medicine 
(Leape, 1994) brought the extent of medical harm in the USA to the fore. Leape 
had been involved in the Medical Practice Study (Brennan et al., 1991) in the 
USA, which uncovered the extent of medical harm through retrospectively 
reviewing patients’ case notes. Importantly, Leape’s paper described how the 
preventable harm, largely, was not the fault of individual doctors but required a 
44 
 
review of the whole healthcare system (a ‘whole systems approach’) to foster 
improvements and prevent similar events happening again. This meant moving 
away from blaming individuals to considering the role of the wider healthcare 
system in provoking errors (Kast and Rosenzweig, 1972, Von Bertalanffy, 
1972). 
Not long after Leape’s publication, Betsy Lehman, the respected health reporter 
at the Boston Globe newspaper, died from a medical error and the paper ran 
the headline ‘Doctors orders killed cancer patient’. This had occurred at one of 
the USA’s leading cancer institutions and ‘spread shockwaves far beyond its 
walls (Millenson, 2002, p59). The news outlets in the USA soon began reporting 
other cases. As Millenson (2002) says, the Lehman incident became: 
‘..the unavoidable anomaly that finally subverted the existing tradition. The 
proud Boston medical community reacted with “profound shock and 
dismay...” The reason it was not ‘circle the wagons and defend ourselves’ 
was because it was so irrevocably bald.’ (Millenson, 2002. p59) 
Following this, many medical groups in the US began to acknowledge that 
errors in medicine were pervasive. This led, in 1999, to the Institute of Medicine 
(IOM) in the USA publishing a report entitled To Err is Human (Kohn et al., 
2000). This report described how between 44,000-98,000 people every year 
died from preventable medical harm in the USA. Following Leape (Leape, 
1994), the report also highlighted how most of these errors were caused by 
failures within the system of care, rather than by individuals themselves.  
Since the 2000, in the UK and internationally, considerable attention has been 
paid to the ways to reduce harm in healthcare (Shojania et al., 2001, 
Department of Health, 2000, Kohn et al., 2000, Vincent, 2011, Amalberti et al., 
2006, Kennedy, 2001).  
The Rise of Patient Safety in the UK 
During the 1990s, the antibiotic infection MRSA began to rise in UK hospitals 
from 2% in 1990 to over 40% in the early 2000s (Johnson et al., 2005), 
becoming a frequent topic in the news media and of great public concern 
45 
 
(Holmes, 2015). In 1999, Vincent et al (2001) repeating the MPS study in the 
USA, found that 10% of patients in British hospitals were harmed by their 
healthcare, and that half of these adverse events were preventable. Together 
with events in the USA (see previous section) the growing concern about poor 
safety in UK hospitals led, in 2000, to the UK Chief Medical Officer’s report An 
Organisation with a Memory (Department of Health, 2000). This report set out 
the scale of harm from medical error in the UK and described how healthcare 
organisations could learn from these events and make improvements. This 
report also drew on lessons from other industries that were particularly 
conscious of safety (such as nuclear power and aviation). Following publication 
of the report, the government responded (Department of Health London, 2001), 
setting up the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA), discussed in the next 
section.    
Often a public outcry has prompted government intervention to improve safety 
in society and this has certainly been the case with regard to patient safety 
(Bennett, 2010, Pidgeon et al., 2003, Millenson, 2002, Holmes, 2015). As each 
case began to unfold, increasingly the public began to comprehend the impact 
of patient harm. The effects of Thalidomide were evident in the disabilities of the 
children; and during the Bristol enquiry parents described the effects on the 
families of those left behind.  This led to the realisation that more fundamental 
organisational changes were needed in the NHS, not only to tasks and 
processes but also to the culture within hospitals to make them more open and 
safety conscious. This was a call to action across the UK NHS, and with the 
establishment of the NPSA in 2001, work began to understand and find ways to 
improve patient safety, with funding allocated, for the first time, to research 
(Lilford, 2002). What changes were needed to improve patient safety, and how 
to embed these into systems wide change, presented both a practical and a 
research challenge in the early 2000s.  
The National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) 
The UK National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) was set up in 2001 with the 
remit of establishing a national reporting and learning system (NRLS) for 
adverse events, training staff in incident investigation techniques, and issuing 
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alerts and guidance to the NHS. The total number of patient safety incidents 
reported by English healthcare organisations to the NPSA by the end of March 
2015 was 11,209,663 (NHS England, 2015b). Early guidance issued by the 
NPSA dealt with specific safety issues, for example preventing accidental 
overdose of potassium chloride concentrate by providing ready-diluted solutions 
(NPSA, 2002) and reducing transfusion errors through standardising medical 
devices in hospitals. Later alerts provided supporting material to aide 
implementation and this developed into wider campaigns, for example the 
‘Clean Your Hands’ campaign to improve hand hygiene and reduce healthcare 
acquired infections (Holmes, 2015)  
In 2004 the NPSA published Seven Steps to Patient Safety (Woodward, 2004). 
This set out the range of areas that healthcare organisations needed to deal 
with, in order to improve patient safety: 
1. Developing a safety culture  
2. Establishing a strong focus on patient safety throughout the organisation  
3. Integrating risk management systems  
4. National and local reporting requirements  
5. Patient and public involvement in safety  
6. Root cause analysis for incident investigation  
7. Transferring lessons from investigations to solutions 
From this and from work in the USA at that time (Berwick et al., 2006, Gosfield 
and Reinertsen, 2005), it was clear that more fundamental work was required to 
embed these steps throughout healthcare organisations. This led to the Health 
Foundation funding the ‘Safer Patients Initiative’ (SPI), a major improvement 
programme in 24 UK hospitals over 4 years. SPI was designed to impact at all 
levels, with a mix of interventions drawn from other industries (including the US 
Navy) and from clinical effectiveness research. Since the completion of this 
programme in 2008 there have been many other initiatives and campaigns to 
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improve patient safety in UK hospitals, most recently the ‘Sign Up to Safety’ 
campaign (NHS England, 2012).  
An overview of the history of risk management and incident reporting 
The idea that risk could be calculated developed from the gambling tables in the 
17th century (Bernstein, 1996, Wootton, 2006). From this developed the 
mathematics of probability which began to be applied in commerce to calculate 
financial and other business risks, particularly for the purposes of insurance. For 
example in 1662 it was used to predict mortality in London for the purposes of 
selling life insurance (Bernstein, 1996). Once risks could be calculated and 
insured against, the thought of accidents being ‘acts of God’ began to be 
questioned (Loimer and Guarnieri, 1996, Guarnieri, 1992, Bernstein, 1996). The 
German sociologist Ulrich Beck (Beck, 1992, Elliott, 2002) describes this as the 
time when a shift began towards a risk society (Beck, 2006):  
...from now on human beings must find (or invent) their own 
explanations and justifications for the disasters which threaten them 
(Beck, 2006, p333).  
With the ability to calculate risks, strategies began to be developed to identify, 
analyse and control or reduce these risks, known as risk management (Walshe, 
2001. p45). In their paper examining the history of risk analysis and risk 
management Covello and Mumpower (1985) set out the variety of ways in 





Figure 6: Methods of risk management in society (Covello and Mumpower, 
1985) 
• Avoiding or eliminating the risk, such as prohibiting the use of a potentially 
dangerous object or substance  
• Regulating or modifying the activity to reduce the magnitude and/or 
frequency of adverse health effects, e.g., by constructing dams, levees, 
and seawalls 
• Reducing the vulnerability of exposed persons and property, e g, by 
requiring the use of safety devices, by elevating buildings in floodplains, by 
immunizing the population, by implementing quarantine laws, or by 
establishing disaster warning systems 
• Developing and implementing post-event mitigation and recovery 
procedures, e.g., by establishing search and rescue teams, stockpiling 
food, providing first aid training, or providing fire extinguishing equipment 
and services 
• Instituting loss-reimbursement and loss-distribution schemes through such 
mechanisms as insurance systems or incentive pay schedules for high risk 
activities 
 
Fundamental to risk management is the identification or detection of risks 
(Dückers et al., 2009. p.6).  With developments in technology, alerts and alarms 
are often used for hazard detection. However these only provide detection 
where technology is in place or where technology is the cause of the failure:  
Despite the great advances in aviation technology over the last decade or 
so we do not see any real improvement in the global accident rate. .... as 
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technical fixes made aircraft more reliable the more obvious became the 
crew failures. (O'Leary, 2002. p245) 
Incident reporting arose from the Aviation Psychology Program in the US Air 
Force during the Second World War (Flanagan, 1954). Since then it has 
developed and spread into many, if not all industries. For example, in the UK, it 
is a required part of health and safety at work legislation, that workplace injuries 
are recorded and reported (Health and Safety Executive, 2013). The purpose of 
incident reporting is to understand the size or extent of safety problems, to 
enable prioritisation of resources towards prevention, and to help organisational 
learning (Secker-Walker and Taylor Adams, 2001b, p 419).  
Whilst being firmly established in business, methods of managing and reducing 
risks did not exist in the NHS until the mid 1990s when the UK government 
became concerned about the rising costs of medical negligence claims:  
It has been estimated that during the 1980s, the frequency of claims rose 
fivefold, while the costs of each claim went up by 250%... By 1996 claims for 
clinical negligence cost the NHS about £200 million. (Walshe, 2001. p.47) 
Management consultants were hired by the Department of Health to advise and 
develop risk management methods for the NHS. An ‘Executive Letter’ was 
issued (NHS-Management-Executive, 1994) encouraging NHS trusts to 
introduce systems for managing risk. Fundamental to these systems was 
knowledge about the risks that existed and soon hospitals began to introduce 
incident reporting systems for adverse events, using the findings from 
investigations into serious adverse events to make safety improvements. Risk 
management was firmly introduced across the NHS in the 1997 White Paper 
entitled ‘The New NHS: modern, dependable’ (Department of Health London, 
1997).  
When research was conducted into the effectiveness of the new risk 
management systems, their shortcomings were highlighted. These included 
clinical staff  being reluctant to report adverse events (Lawton and Parker, 
2002), resulting in managers only being aware of a fraction of the adverse 
events that were taking place in their hospitals (Bates et al., 1995, Sari et al., 
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2007). It was evident from this, and from research into the factors underpinning 
safety improvements in other industries (Reason, 1997, Reason, 1990, Cox and 
Cheyne, 2000, Glendon and Stanton, 2000, Fleming, 2001),  that further 
organisational changes were needed in the NHS, including changes to the 
culture to make it more open and fair (Department of Health, 2000, Kohn et al., 
2000).  
Table 2: Timeline of the history of safety and risk related to medicine 
Date History Reference 
BC • Code of Hammurabi (1750 BC) 
• Hippocrates (5th Century BC) 
Wootton, 2006. 
 Doctors have little to offer in terms of effective 
treatments (apart from bone setting and 
amputations) until the mid 19th century 
Wootton, 2006. 
 Many examples in literature through the ages 




1421 The earliest reference to medical regulation in 
the UK dates from 1421, when physicians 
petitioned parliament to ask that nobody 
without appropriate qualifications be allowed 
to practise medicine. The doctors said that 
unqualified practitioners caused "great harm 
and slaughter of many men” (see note 1 to 
table) 





1500s 1511 Statute placed regulation of the medical 
profession in the hands of the bishops – 
medicine and religion intertwined – aim to 
suppress quacks 
1518 College of Physicians set up and takes 
over licensing 
Raach, 1944. 
17th C Probability theory develops mainly applied to 
gambling and to risks in finance and 
commerce but in 1662 used to predict 
mortality for life insurance.  
Start of the industrial revolution and 
establishment of factories and organised 




Period of government legislation for the safety 
of the workforce, followed up with inspection 
and regulation:  
• Factories Act and start of Factories 
Inspectorate (established 1833).  
• Mines Inspectorate established in 1843 
Health and Safety 
Executive, 2015. 
UK National Archives, 
2016. 
 Many accidents seen as ‘acts of god’ – 
religion important in people’s lives 
Guarnieri, 1992. 
 Temperance movement – support for the 
view that alcohol is primary cause of 
accidents at work  
View prevailed that people were responsible 




for their own safety and therefore guilt if 
injured. 
 Growth in insurance and workmen’s 
compensation schemes – insurance 
companies begin to question high rates of 
accidents and the notion that these are all the 
responsibility of the individual 
 
1847 Ignaz Semelweis proposes that hand washing 
with chlorinated lime solution would reduce 
maternal mortality – doctors were offended by 
the suggestion that they were unclean. In 
1861 he publishes a book lamenting the slow 
adoption of his ideas and dies the same year.   
Semmelweis, 1861 
(republished 1983) 
1854   Florence Nightingale goes to Crimea with a 
group of nurses and begins her campaign to 
improve nursing and to improve conditions in 
army and other hospitals – her campaigning 
continues until her death in 1910 
Nightingale, 1863. 
1858 Medical Act empowered the medical 
profession to create and enforce own 
professional standards - GMC set up. 
Professional code states that Drs cannot 






Increase in numbers entering workhouses 
when regions cut benefits to the poorest. 
Workhouse medical officers and nurses 




unprepared and many tragic cases of 
starvation and neglect of vulnerable people. 
Local Government sought to blame individual 
doctors for cases of medical neglect 
1850 -
1914 
Start of use of anaesthesia 
1865 Lister demonstrates principles of 
antiseptic surgery – and germ theory.  
Development and more acceptance of germ 
theory and asepsis  
Wootton, 2006. 
 Move towards a more secular society with 
explanations required for incidents, with less 




The establishment and growth in the number 
of hospitals – services being organised 
around doctors  
Ernest A Codman sets out to improve the 
outcome of surgery in the USA through 
recording ‘end results’ and setting standards 
for operating theatres and surgical hospitals – 
his ideas are ridiculed and thrown out and he 





Pickstone’s first phase of healthcare 
development: Productionist – healthcare 
oriented towards developing and maintaining 





• Public Health 
• Poor Laws 
• Ante natal care starts; registration of 
midwives; maternity hospitals  
1918 – 
1950s 
Pickstone’s second phase of health care 
development: Communitarianism – social 
solidarity; risks become shared (contributions 
to pay for care when needed) 
Cooter and 
Pickstone, 2000. 
 Growth in what doctors can offer in terms of 
effective treatment 
Sharpe and Faden, 
1998 
 Shift from a social to a medical model of 
health (especially in maternity care) 
Bryers and Van 
Teijlingen, 2010. 
 Drs retain a high level of professional 
autonomy and are held in high regard by the 
public 
Willis, 2006. 
1928 Committee established in the UK to 
investigate maternal deaths  
Ngan Kee, 2005. 
 UK Road Safety legislation and start of Royal 
Society for the Prevention of Accidents  
ROSPA, 2016. 
 View prevails that accidents are caused by 
individuals – psychology research into 




1930s The term ‘accident’ is questioned – Gibson 
and Haddon suggest that ‘causes of injury’ 
should be adopted in research. 
Ilan and Fowler, 
2005, Guarnieri, 
1992. 
1940s WW2 and rise of ergonomics as a subject 
area for research – from war research into 
man-machine interface; goes on to be applied 
in civilian life. Physiologists and psychologists 
form the Ergonomics Research Society (2009 
name change to Ergonomics and Human 
Factors) 
Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society - 
HFES 
1948 NHS established – healthcare becomes more 
of an industry and more organised 
Klein, 1995. 
 Health and safety embedded in NHS to 
prevent workplace accidents – all falls 
reported to HSE; any staff off work for more 
than a set period due to work injury reported. 
HSE, 2015. 
1950s The 1950 Medical Act introduced disciplinary 
boards and a right of appeal to the General 
Medical Council 
BMJ, “The Medical 
Act, 1950”  
1952 Confidential enquiry into maternal deaths set 
up  
Ngan Kee, 2005. 
1960s Thalidomide prescribed to pregnant women 
causing birth defects – 1963 Safety in Drugs 
Committee set up – drugs begin to be 
licensed 
Emanuel et al., 2012. 
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1966 Health Memorandum published by DHSS 
recommended adopting standardized 
complaints procedures. Guidelines suggested 
complaints be handled by physicians and 
unnecessary for most complaints to be 
considered by someone outside the medical 
organisation – conflicting with main principles 
of effective regulation that it be conducted by 
independent agents. 
Doctors still held in high regard so thinking 
was that they would want to resolve their own 
complaints to serve the patients best 
interests. 
Mulcahy, 2003, 
Mulcahy and Tritter, 
1998, Chacko, 2009.   
1969 - 
1980 
1969 Ely Hospital public inquiry over the 
scandal of patients being mistreated – there 
then followed 18 more inquiries up to 1980 – 
all about mistreatment of patients. The public 
began to lose confidence in the medical 
profession. 
Walshe and Higgins, 
2002, Walshe and 
Shortell, 2004.  
1970s Hospital Advisory Service set up – developed 
into the Commission for Healthcare 
Improvement (CHI) and now the Care Quality 
Commission (CQC) 
 
1973 Davies Committee report on the NHS 
Complaints procedures – recommended 
external involvement – recognised that 





1974 Don Harper Mills conducts first 
comprehensive case note review in a study of 
medical error in Californian hospitals – 
motivated by economic and legal concerns – 
didn’t lead to any changes 
Mills, 1978, 
Millenson, 2002. 
 Office of the Health Service Commissioner 
(later the Ombudsman) set up as 
independent investigator of complaints – 
although could not investigate complaints 
relating to the ‘consequence of the exercise 
of clinical judgement’. 
Chacko, 2009. 
1976 Ivan Illich publishes Limits to Medicine – 
arguing that medicine was now a danger to 
our health, causing more deaths and injuries 
than it was curing. 
This is followed in 1981 by Ian Kennedy’s 
‘The Unmasking of Medicine’  - initiates 
debate about patients as consumers, involved 
in decisions about their care 
Illich, 1976a, 
Kennedy, 1981. 
1975 Litigation  – around 500 claims in the year - 
value circa £1m – starts to grow 
Walshe, in Vincent 
2001 p. 47 
1980s MRSA begins to be recognised as a problem 
in NHS hospitals (personal experience) 
Holmes, 2015 
1982 Action for Victims of Medical Accidents set up 
following public reaction to the television play 




1983 National Health Service Management Enquiry 
introduces managerialism into NHS – doctors 
begin to be managed by managers 
1989 split between purchasers and providers 
and the creation of NHS Trusts – 10 years 
later CEO’s of Trusts given statutory duty of 
quality  
Griffiths, 1983. 
1984 Harvard Medical Practice Study undertaken Brennan et al., 1991, 
Millenson, 2002. 
1985 Hospital Complaints Procedures Act passed – 
an MP developed septicaemia due to his 
treatment – frustrated at complaints 
procedures he instigated the bill requiring all 
hospitals to have proper complaints 
procedures and to tell patients about them 
Chacko, 2009. 
1985 Birmingham bone tumour service inquiry 
demonstrates service failings – misdiagnosis 
of cancer in many cases 
Jones and Hall, 1993. 
1980s Chernobyl 1988; Pipa Alpha 1989; Kings 
Cross Fire; Herald of Free Enterprise;  
These inquiry reports begin to enunciate the 
failures of management and the board. 












1990s Clinical effectiveness gains credence  
 
John Major’s Patients Charter – idea of an 
‘empowered patient’ set out what patients 
could expect – raised public awareness of 
rights and standards. 
Secker-Walker and 
Donaldson, 2001a 
1990s Crown indemnity for clinical negligence 
introduced and NHS assumes all liability. 
 
Risk management begins to grow in NHS – 
mainly due to costs of litigation – prior to this 
most hospitals had litigation and complaints 
systems plus health and safety committees 
and incident reporting for staff injuries. Also 
some pharmacists collected reports on 
medication errors for internal learning. Little 
ownership corporately and functions not 
linked together. 
1992 DH commission risk management 
consultants to  develop manual for NHS – 
published 1993 
1995 Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts 
set up – and the NHS Litigation Authority - 
incentivises trusts to develop risk 
management systems 









 GP Harold Shipman arrested for murder of 15 
patients 
Smith, 2002-2005, 
Mohammed et al., 
2001 
 Growth in media interest in MRSA associated 
with unclean hospitals. 2880 articles on 
MRSA published in 12 UK newspapers 
between 1994 and 2005(Boyce et al., 2009) 
Boyce et al., 2009 
 Questioning of role of GMC in regulating 
doctors – no doctors struck off for failing to 
attend to patients but several struck off for 
actions that disgrace the profession.  
Chacko, 2009 
1994 Lucien Leape’s paper in JAMA – Error in 
Medicine 
Washington Post article gains national 
attention (role of media important from now) 
Leape, 1994, 
Millenson, 2002. 
1994 Being Heard report published by Department 
of Health – patients expressed fear that 
professional loyalties may override fair play in 
handling complaints – you complain to a 
person you are complaining about. 
Department of Health 
London, 1994. 
1995 Boston Globe reporter Betsy Lehman dies 






prominent cancer institutions, Dana-Faber 
Newspaper investigates and many other 
stories begin to be published around the 
USA. 
Boston medical community respond with 
shock and dismay, not ‘circling the wagons’ 
IHI begin to get involved in reducing errors in 
medicine 
Berwick et al., 2006. 
1995 Quality in Australian Healthcare Study 
published setting out scale of medical harm 
Wilson et al., 1995 
1996 Value of negligence claims circa £200m per 
year 
Number of claims had risen from 500 per year 
in 1975 to 6000 in 1992 and 10,000 in 1999 
Walshe, 2001 p.47 
Chacko, 2009 
1997 American Medical Association form the 
National Patient Safety Foundation following 
public response to Leape’s paper and 
subsequent media furore 
Millenson, 2002. 
1997 UK Government White Paper ‘The New NHS: 
modern ● dependable’, introduces:  
‘a new system of clinical governance in NHS 
Trusts and primary care to ensure that clinical 
standards are met, and that processes are in 
place to ensure continuous improvement, 
backed by a new statutory duty for quality in 
Department of Health 
London, 1997.  
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NHS Trusts. (p24) 
1998 Bristol Inquiry into deaths of children from 
heart surgery – interim report published 
Kennedy, 2001, 
Savage, 1998. 
1998 GMC publish new guidelines on Good 
Medical Practice and Maintaining Good 
Medical Practice – sent to every registered 
doctor – laying explicit individual 
responsibilities on medical staff, and strongly 
supporting the philosophy of clinical 
governance. 
DH publishes A First Class Service: Quality in 
the NHS – includes risk reduction 








1999 Institute of Medicine releases ‘To Err is 
Human’ stating that between 48-98,000 
Americans die in hospitals every year due to 
preventable medical errors. 
Kohn et al, 2000. 
1999 UK Health Act places statutory duty of quality 
on NHS Trusts to assure and improve the 
quality of care they deliver 
Secker-Walker and 
Donaldson, 2001a 
1999 UK Dept of Health consultation paper issued 
to improve the management of poorly 
performing doctors. 
Department of Health 
London, 1999. 
2000 British Medical Journal devotes whole issue 
to medical error:  








2001 Death of Wayne Jowett from medication error 
in Nottingham hospital – first independent 
investigation using techniques used in airline 
industry. The report described over 40 
examples of barriers and defences in the 
hospital’s systems and procedures that had 
been breached.  
Toft, 2001. 
2001 The Pursuing Perfection Demonstration 
Programme funded by Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation starts in 13 hospital organisations 
across the US and Europe (including the UK), 
supported by IHI  
Kabcenell et al., 
2010. 
2004 IHI announce launch of 100,000 Lives 
Campaign in US hospitals 
Berwick et al., 2006. 
2004-
2008 
Health Foundation announce Safer Patients 
Initiative – calling for applicant NHS Trusts to 
work with IHI  
Once the programme starts, the research in 
this thesis begins. 
 
Note 1:  
Medical Regulation: One of the earliest reference to action to reduce the risk 
of patient harm appeared in 1421 (Raach, 1944) when physicians petitioned 
parliament to outlaw unqualified practitioners who the doctors described as 
causing ‘great harm and slaughter of many men’. Thus the regulation of the 
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medical profession was established. In 1518 the College of Physicians was set 
up and this took over the licensing of medical practitioners (Raach, 1944). In 
1858 the Medical Act was passed setting up the General Medical Council 
(GMC) (Chacko, 2009) empowering the medical profession to create and 
enforce its own professional standards. With the rise in cases of patient harm in 
the media in the UK, often blaming individual doctors, the government issued a 
consultation paper leading to the establishment of the National Clinical 
Assessment Service (NCAS) to help trusts deal with doctors who were not 
performing to standard, or who were seen as a danger to patient safety 
(Department of Health London, 1999). Further changes were made in the 
management and regulation of the medical profession to assure the safety of 
patients. The regulation of healthcare professions is now embedded in the UK 
as one of the cornerstones of patient safety, with the aim of ensuring that all 
those caring for patients are qualified with their knowledge kept up to date 




DEFINITION of TERMS  
Table 3: Definition of terms commonly used in relation to safety  
 Definitions from the online 
Oxford Dictionary (Oxford 
Dictionaries, 2016) 
Definitions used in healthcare 
Harm:   
 
Physical injury, especially 
that which is deliberately 
inflicted;  Material damage; 
Actual or potential ill effects 
or danger 
Difficult to define – many 
definitions in use (see section 1).  
The simplest definition of harm in 
healthcare is a negative effect, 
whether or not it is evident to the 




An unfortunate incident that 
happens unexpectedly and 
unintentionally, typically 
resulting in damage or injury 
As the Oxford Dictionary.  
Error  
 
A mistake The failure to complete a planned 
action as intended, or the use of 
an incorrect plan of action to 
achieve a given aim (Department 
of Health, 2000, p.xii) 
Complication Something that complicates 
or adds difficulties; a 
complicating factor. 
As the Oxford Dictionary. 
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Also (Med.), an additional 
disorder or condition that 
develops during the course of 
an existing one; frequently in 





Term not in the Oxford 
Dictionary 
Any injury caused as a result of 
treatment and care (World Health 
Organisation, 2015, p.107) 
An event or omission arising 
during clinical care and causing 
physical or psychological injury to 
a patient (Department of Health, 
2000 p.xii) 
Near Miss (a) A shot that only just 
misses a target; also in 
extended use; (b) A situation 
in which a collision is 
narrowly avoided. 
 
An event or situation that did not 
produce patient injury, but only 
because of chance (World Health 
Organisation, 2015, p107) 
A situation in which an event or 
omission, or a sequence of events 
or omissions, arising during 
clinical care fails to develop 
further, whether or not as the 
result of compensating action, 
thus preventing injury to a patient 





The condition of being 
protected from or unlikely to 
cause danger, risk, or injury 
As the Oxford Dictionary  
Risk  
 
A situation involving 
exposure to danger 
The likelihood, high or low, that 
somebody or something will be 
harmed by a hazard, multiplied by 
the severity of the potential harm 




The forecasting and 
evaluation of risks in 
business and commerce, 
combined with the 
identification of procedures to 
avoid or minimize the impact 
of such risks 
The activities, including planning, 
organizing, directing, evaluating 
and implementing, which are 
involved in reducing the risk of 
injury to patients and health care 
workers. (World Health 
Organisation, 2015, p107) 
Patient 
safety 
Term not in OED Freedom from accidental or 
preventable injuries produced by 
medical care. Practices or 
interventions that improve patient 
safety are those that reduce the 
occurrence of preventable 
adverse events (World Health 




Term not in OED A patient safety incident is an 
event or circumstance that could 
have resulted, or did result, in 
unnecessary harm to a patient 
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(Runciman et al., 2009) 
 
Table 4: Terms used in patient safety research and in the investigation of errors 
and adverse events in healthcare  
Term Definition and reference 
Barriers and 
defences 
Measures put in place to prevent or reduce the risk of error 
or accident and its impact, including (Reason, 1997): 
• Alarms and warnings 
• Guidance and guidelines 
• Training and awareness 
• Measures for containment, escape and rescue 
Active failures Those made by people. They may include incorrect choices 
due to inexperience; lack of training; over-confidence; lapses 
in concentration due to tiredness or competing demands; 
and violations (see below) (Reason, 1997) 
Latent conditions Latent: Lying dormant or hidden until circumstances are 
suitable for development or manifestation (Oxford 
Dictionaries, 2016) 
The underlying conditions that unless addressed, are likely 
to lead to an error or accident happening. Usually they are 
only revealed when the accident takes place. Latent 
conditions may include poor design of equipment; ineffective 
leadership; poor communication; the lack of suitable safety 
procedures; and poor or no training.  
Error provoking The combined effect of the underlying causes of active 
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conditions failures and latent conditions described above.  
Violations Deliberate acts that circumvent rules and procedures (such 
as exceeding the speed limit in a car). 
Violate: to break or fail to comply with (a rule or formal 
agreement) (Oxford Dictionaries, 2016) 
Organisational 
accident 
Comparatively rare but often catastrophic events that occur 
within complex organisations. They have multiple causes 
involving many people operating at different levels within the 
organisation (Reason, 1997). 
Organisational 
culture 
Shared basic assumptions about the way things are done in 
an organisation: ‘how we do things around here’ (Vincent, 
2011, p.272) 
Safety Culture The product of individual and group values, attitudes, 
competencies and patterns of behaviour that determine 
commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an 
organisations health and safety programmes (Vincent, 2011 
p.273) 
System A set of things working together as parts of a mechanism or 
an interconnecting network; a complex whole (Oxford 
Dictionaries, 2016) 
Systems theory Understanding an organisation as a total system including 
the configuration of sub-systems (Kast and Rosenzweig, 
1972, Von Bertalanffy, 1972) 
Safety conscious Industries where safety is considered paramount such as 
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industries nuclear power; aviation; and petro-chemicals.  
Human Factors “Ergonomics (or Human Factors) is the scientific discipline 
concerned with the understanding of interactions among 
humans and other elements of a system, and the profession 
that applies theory, principles, data and methods to design 
in order to optimise human well-being and overall system 
performance.” (International Ergonomics Association, 2016)  
Clinical Human 
Factors 
“Enhancing clinical performance through an understanding 
of the effects of teamwork, tasks, equipment, workspace, 
culture, organisation on human behaviour and abilities, and 
application of that knowledge in clinical settings.” (Clinical 
Human Factors Group (CHFG), 2016) 
Non-technical 
skills 
Cognitive and social skills that complement a workers 
technical skills (Flin et al., 2008). These include: 
• Situation awareness  
• Decision making 
• Communication  
• Teamwork 
• Leadership  
• Managing stress 





Table 5: Tabulation of research methods used across the studies 
Study 1. SPI  2. WISER 3. Never 
Events 
4. QUASER 




yes yes  yes 
Survey yes yes   
Observation    yes 
Documentary 
analysis 
yes   yes 
Framework 
Analysis 
 yes yes yes 
Cross case 
analysis 
yes  yes  yes 
Content 
analysis 









at 2 time 
points 
  Data collected 




24 7 9 10 
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 Table 6: Glossary of Acronyms  
Acronym Full description Country 
BMJ British Medical Journal UK 
CHFG The Clinical Human Factors Group UK 
CHI Commission for Healthcare Improvement (CHI) - now 
the Care Quality Commission (CQC) 
UK 
CNST Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts UK 
CQC The Care Quality Commission UK 
CT Computerised Tomography   
DH  The Department of Health UK 
DHSS  
 
Department of Health and Social Security (now DH) UK 
EU European Union European 
FP7 Framework 7 research programme of the European 
Union 
European 
GMC The General Medical Council UK 
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GP General Practitioner UK 
HF The Health Foundation UK 
HFES Human Factors and Ergonomics Society   USA 
HSE The Health and Safety Executive UK 
IHI The Institute of Healthcare Improvement USA 
IOM The Institute of Medicine USA 
JAMA Journal of the American Medical Association USA 
MeSH Medical Subject Heading  
MRI Magnetic Resonance Imaging  
MRSA Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus  
NCAS National Clinical Assessment Service  UK 
NHS National Health Service UK 
NHSI National Institute for Innovation and Improvement UK 
NICE The National Institute for Clinical Excellence UK 
NPSA National Patient Safety Agency UK 
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NRLS The National Reporting and Learning System UK 
QI Quality Improvement   
QUASER Quality and Safety in Europe by Research  
ROSPA Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents UK 
SJB The author: Susan J Burnett  
SPI The Safer Patients Initiative UK 
WHO The World Health Organisation International 
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